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The basis of this study are two underlying empirical projects.  In the first one Viktor interviewed 17 
Nobel Laureates trying to understand their cognitive complexity. (Dörfler & Eden, 2014a, 2017)  In the 
second one Marc interviewed 18 top chefs trying to understand their creativity. (Stierand, 2015; 
Stierand & Dörfler, 2016; Stierand et al., 2014)  Hence, both studies aimed at a high-complexity 
phenomenon in a well-defined context (science and haute cuisine respectively) and aimed at 
understanding the experiences of extraordinary achievers in these contexts. (Dörfler & Stierand, 
forthcoming)  Both studies have been grounded in an interpretivist stance, and in both cases we were 
trying to collect thick data and achieve deep and insightful learning; this led us to develop a new 
method for each of the studies.  The method developed for the Nobel Laureates project is called 
Intuitive Cyclic Phenomenology (Dörfler & Eden, 2014b), as it explicitly incorporates the intuition of 
the researchers and it has a number of embedded cycles in the process.  The method developed for 
the top chef project is called Insider Explanatory Phenomenology (Stierand & Dörfler, 2014), as it 
explicitly incorporates the insider view of the researcher, who previously worked as a chef in Michelin 
starred restaurants and the purpose was to develop an interpretive-explanatory model.  Naturally, in 
both projects the notion of bracketing came up as an important consideration, and we have developed 
a way of implementing bracketing through transpersonal reflexivity.  The aim of this study is to unpack 
this view of bracketing as we believe that doing it well can substantially increase the quality of the 
findings and it has relevance to many other inquiries conducted following similar research 
philosophies.  Important to mention is that we do not see the use of intuition and the insider view as 
a limitation; to the contrary, we believe that these were indispensable and key for achieving significant 
and game-changing findings.  Thus, the notion bracketing, as we describe it here and as we have 
applied it, is not about getting rid of subjective components and removing pre-understandings but 
raising awareness of them and explicitly incorporating them. 
As we were primarily interested in the personal experiences of our interviewees, we needed to deal 
with the fact that these personal experiences cannot be separated from the context of the experience.  
Therefore, we considered ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐ ?immediate context, their Dasein, as well as their broader 
spatio-temporal Lebenswelt that also accounts for the intellectual tradition and domain knowledge of 
the interviewees ? ĨŝĞůĚŽĨƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ.  In a sense, the Nobel Laureates projects also made use of the 
insider view as Viktor as a researcher is naturally part of the Lebenswelt of Scientists at large.  Yet, 
having not been awarded a Nobel Prize himself, Viktor needed to prepare for each interview 
meticulously in order to rapidly win the trust of the interviewees in the first few minutes of the 
interview.  This is only a little glimpse into two extremely enriching and fascinating research 
experiences that both continuously challenged our personal worldviews and required from us to 
revise some of the fundamental notions of phenomenology, particularly the issue of bracketing. 
In its original form, phenomenology came about in a profoundly positivist-dominated world of science 
and philosophy.  Husserl, the founding father of phenomenology and student of Brentano, faced 
strong opposition from the heavily positivist academic world when he attempted to establish new 
foundations of scientific inquiry by focusing on the notion of lived experience. For a long time, scholars 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ,ƵƐƐĞƌů ?Ɛnotion of bracketing as an attempt to approximate the positivist ideal of 
objectivity, because they believe that any form of scientific inquiry needs to remove the researcher 
from the findings.  tĞďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐŶŽƚ,ƵƐƐĞƌů ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? 
Husserl (1913) talked about three forms of bracketing: the epoché or phenomenological attitude; the 
phenomenological psychological reduction; and the transcendental phenomenological reduction.  
Epoché describes the mode in which the researcher refrains from explanations, scientific conceptions 
ĂŶĚŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐŽĂƐƚŽ ?ƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚĞƵŶƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƉƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞůŝǀĞĚ ?ĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇǁŽƌůĚ ?. (Finlay, 
2008: 3)  This is a critical position where nothing is taken for granted (Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Zaner, 
1975), beliefs, values, or knowledge about the phenomenon are  ?ƉƵƚŽƵƚŽĨƉůĂǇ ?(Husserl, 1936: 237); 
the researcher refrains from judgment (Husserl, 1913, 1936; Moran, 2000).  Phenomenological 
psychological reduction, in turn, only requires the researchers (Giorgi, 1997) to suspend their  ?ďĞůŝĞĨ
in the existence of what presents itself in the life-world.  Instead the focus is on the subjective 
ĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ ?(Finlay, 2008: 3).  So, the researcher brackets the world but not the 
empirical subject, to experience the natural attitude of the person in all its mundanity (Giorgi, 1997; 
Husserl, 1936).  dƌĂŶƐĐĞŶĚĞŶƚĂůƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝƐ ?ĂŵŽƌĞƌĂĚŝĐĂůǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞepoché 
ǁŚĞƌĞĂ ?'ŽĚ ?ƐĞǇĞǀŝĞǁ ?ŝƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚ ?(Finlay, 2008: 3); Husserl argued that it allows the philosopher 
ƚŽďĞ ?ĂďŽǀĞŚŝƐŽǁŶŶĂƚƵƌĂůďĞŝŶŐĂŶĚĂďŽǀĞƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?(Husserl, 1936: 152). 
Some later interpretations of the notion of bracketing shifted towards what we wanted to achieve; 
for instance Giorgi (1994: 212) considers it as a ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ  ?ŽŶĞ ůŽŽŬƐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĚĂƚĂǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ
ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞ ŽĨ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ŽƉĞŶŶĞƐƐ ? and Finlay (2009: 13) talks about Ă  ?ĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐ ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
bracketing preunderstandings and exploiting them rĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞůǇĂƐĂƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨŝŶƐŝŐŚƚ ?.  Similarly, the 
approach in these cases is aligned with our intentions to understand the interviewees ?perspective 
including the identification of elements that blur the invariant but essential nature of interviewees ? 
experiences (Giorgi, 1994; Husserl, 1931).  This is also the reason for the numerous iterative cycles in 
both studies, ƚƌĞĂĚŝŶŐĂĨŝŶĞůŝŶĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ?ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐĂŶĚŶŽƚ-ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐ ?. (Gioia et al., 2012: 21)  These 
conceptualisations, however, say little about the implementation. 
In conclusion, we have implemented bracketing in two stages in both studies, although the order of 
these stages was different.  One stage, primarily corresponding to epoché, was practiced by the 
interviewer; this stage was primarily focused on suspending the judgement in order to arrive at an 
intuitive understanding of the interviewees ? subjective accounts.  The other stage was practiced in the 
interaction between the interviewer and the co-researcher; this mainly corresponds to the 
phenomenological psychological reduction.  The purpose of this stage was raising the awareness of 
presumptions, previous knowledge and beliefs that the interviewer is not aware of; this has been 
achieved by practicing transpersonal reflexivity. (Brannick & Coghlan, 2007; Hibbert & Cunliffe, 2015; 
Hibbert et al., 2014)  By this we mean that the co-researcher, who was not involved in the interviews 
and did not read them, holds a mirror to the interviewer in support of the reflexive process.  Going 
through the cycles present in both methods also meant going back and forth between the two forms 
of bracketing ?ƚŚƵƐĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐƚŚĞĂďŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?attitude of relative openness ?. 
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